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Abstract. Bilateral trade is a fundamental economic scenario comprising a strategically acting buyer
and seller (holding an item), each holding valuations for the item, drawn from publicly known distri-
butions. A mechanism is supposed to facilitate trade between these agents, if such trade is beneficial.
It was recently shown that the only mechanisms that are simultaneously dominant strategy incentive
compatible, strongly budget balanced, and ex-post individually rational, are fixed price mechanisms,
i.e., mechanisms that are parametrised by a price p, and trade occurs if and only if the valuation of the
buyer is at least p and the valuation of the seller is at most p.
The gain from trade is the increase in welfare that results from applying a mechanism; here we study the
gain from trade achievable by fixed price mechanisms. We explore this question for both the bilateral
trade setting, and a double auction setting where there are multiple buyers and sellers. We first identify
a fixed price mechanism that achieves a gain from trade of at least 2/r times the optimum, where
r is the probability that the seller’s valuation does not exceed the buyer’s valuation. This extends
a previous result by McAfee. Subsequently, we improve this approximation factor in an asymptotic
sense, by showing that a more sophisticated rule for setting the fixed price results in an expected gain
from trade within a factor O(log(1/r)) of the optimal gain from trade. This is asymptotically the best
approximation factor possible.
Lastly, we extend our study of fixed price mechanisms to the double auction setting defined by a set
of multiple i.i.d. unit demand buyers, and i.i.d. unit supply sellers. We present a fixed price mechanism
that achieves a gain from trade that achieves for all ǫ > 0 a gain from trade of at least (1− ǫ) times the
expected optimal gain from trade with probability 1 − 2/e#Tǫ
2/2, where #T is the expected number
of trades resulting from the double auction. This can be interpreted as a “large market” result: Full
efficiency is achieved in the limit, as the market gets thicker.
1 Introduction
Bilateral trade is a fundamental economic scenario comprising a buyer and a seller. The seller holds
one item, and can possibly trade this item with the buyer for some price. The buyer and the seller
each have a (non-negative real-valued) valuation for the item that is up for trade. The buyer’s
valuation is only known by the buyer and the seller’s valuation is only known by the seller. The
buyer and seller both want to maximise their utility, which is assumed to be quasi-linear, i.e., of
the form x · v− p, where x is a 0/1-variable that is set to 1 if and only if the agent holds the item, v
is the agent’s value for the item, and p is the price paid/received by the agent. In the buyer’s case
p is non-negative and represents how much the buyer has to pay. In the seller’s case, the price p is
non-positive because the seller receives money to transfer her item.
The main problem studied for this bilateral trade setting is one in mechanism design: which
mechanism maximises the social welfare (i.e., total utility of both players)? A direct revelation
mechanism for this setting solicits the valuations of the buyer and the seller. Subsequently it deter-
mines whether the buyer and the seller should trade and which prices they have to pay or receive.
We would like any mechanism to satisfy the following properties:
– Dominant strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC): It should be a dominant strategy for the
buyer and seller to submit their true valuations to the mechanism.
– Ex-post individual rationality (ex-post IR): Neither agent should end up with a negative utility
if the agent’s true valuation is submitted to the mechanism.
– Strong budget balance (SBB): The price paid by the buyer is equal to the price received by the
seller, i.e., the mechanism does not extract money from the market, nor does it inject money
into the market.
While the valuations of the buyer and seller are known by the buyer and seller only, it is assumed
that there is still distributional public knowledge about their valuations. More precisely, it is assumed
that there are two publicly known distributions from which the buyer and seller independently draw
their valuations. The mechanism may thus make use of these distributions in order to determine
the outcome.
Ideally, we would want the mechanism to have the seller trade with the buyer whenever the
buyer’s valuation exceeds the seller’s valuation. The expected total utility that would result from
trading as such is referred to as the optimal social welfare. Unfortunately the optimal social welfare
is not achievable, as shown by Myerson and Satterthwaite [16]: No bilateral trade mechanism is
simultaneously DSIC, IR, weakly budged balanced, and social-welfare optimizing. Weak budget
balance (WBB) is less restrictive than strong budget balance, as WBB only requires that no money
be injected into the market, while the mechanism is allowed to extract money from the market.
For the classic bilateral trade setting, it was recently shown [5] that the only direct revelation
mechanisms that are simultaneously incentive compatible, strongly budget balanced, and ex-post
individually rational, are fixed price mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms that are parametrised by a price
p, and trade occurs if and only if the valuation of the buyer is at least p and the valuation of the
seller is at most p.
An alternative —and more challenging to approximate— objective to the social welfare is the
gain from trade, which measures the expected increase in total utility that is achievable by applying
the mechanism, with respect to the initial allocation. For example, if a seller holds an item that
she values $4 and a buyer values the same item $10, whenever a fix price mechanism sets a price
4 ≤ p ≤ 10, the buyer and the seller trade producing a gain from trade of $6. Whenever the price p
is set lower than $4 or greater than $10 no trade occur, and the gain from trade is 0.
McAfee [15] has shown that if the median of the distribution of the seller’s valuation is less than
the median of the distribution of the buyer’s valuation, then there is a fixed price mechanism for
which the expected gain from trade is at least half of the optimal gain from trade. In fact, it was
shown for this special case that by setting the fixed price anywhere in between the two medians,
half of the optimal gain from trade is guaranteed. We extend this result by showing that the optimal
gain from trade is at least 2/r times the gain from trade achievable by a fixed price mechanism,
where r is the probability that the seller’s valuation does not exceed the buyer’s valuation (which
is the condition under which a gain from trade is possible in the first place).
Subsequently, we improve this approximation factor in an asymptotic sense, by showing that a
more sophisticated rule for setting the fixed price results in an expected gain from trade within a
factor O(log(1/r)) of the optimal gain from trade. This is asymptotically the best approximation
factor possible, which is shown by an appropriate example of a bilateral trade setting for which
every fixed price achieves an expected gain from trade of Ω(log(1/r)) times the expected gain from
trade.
2
It follows from our results that our mechanisms cannot approximate the gain from trade if the
probability of trading is small. Indeed, we prove a general negative result showing that the ratio
between the gain from trade of a DSIC mechanism and the optimal gain from trade can be arbitrarily
small as the support of the distribution grows. A similar result has been proved independently in
[2].
We finally extend our study to the double auction setting, where there are multiple buyers and
sellers, each seller holding one item and each buyer having a demand for obtaining at most one item.
The valuations of the n buyers are independently drawn from a common probability distribution,
and the same holds for the m sellers, although the probability distribution of the sellers may be
distinct from that of the buyers.
1.1 Our Results
The first results presented in this paper concern the bilateral trade problem. It is known that if a
mechanism has to satisfy IR, DSIC, and SBB, then it must be a fixed price mechanism [5], i.e., the
mechanism fixes a price p and posts it to the buyer and the seller. We want to understand how this
price p has to be chosen.
McAfee’s result of [15] states that in case the seller’s median is less than the buyer’s median, then
setting the price in between the medians of the buyer and the seller results in a 2-approximation to
the optimal gain from trade. Our first result is a strict generalization of [15] where the approximation
to the optimal gain from trade is given as a function of the probability that a trade is efficient, in
other words: the probability that the valuation drawn from the buyer is greater than the valuation
drawn from the seller. This parameter is referred to as r = Prv∼f,w∼g[v ≥ w], where f is the buyer’s
distribution and g is the seller’s distribution.
In particular, we show that setting the price p such that Prv∼f [v ≥ p] = Prw∼g[w ≤ p] results
in a r/2-approximation to the optimal gain from trade.
Then, we show how that it is possible to improve the approximation factor of 2/r considerably
in an asymptotic sense: We prove that by using a more complex rule for determining the fixed
price p, the optimal gain from trade is at most a factor of O(log(1/r)) times the gain from trade
when trading at price p. When r is small, this results in a big improvement when compared to the
approximation factor that we established in the previous section. Our mechanism works by showing
that we can decompose “roughly” the entire probability space into at most log(1/r)+1 such events,
so that choosing the best fixed price corresponding to each of these events results in a gain from
trade that is an O(log(1/r))-approximation to the optimal gain from trade.
Finally, we want to consider the double auction setting. In this setting, we extend the definition
of a fixed price mechanism in a natural way: the mechanism computes a single price p, buyers with
a valuation greater than p and sellers with a valuation lower than p will be allowed to trade. If the
sets of allowed buyers and allowed sellers have different cardinalities, agents will be removed from
the biggest set uniformly at random so that the cardinality of the two sets will be equal.
The fixed price mechanism that we propose for the double auction setting achieves a gain from
trade that is a 1− ǫ approximation to the optimal gain from trade with probability (1− 1/eǫ
2#T/2)
where #T is the expected number of trades of the mechanism. This implies that if the double auction
instance is such that a relatively small expected number of trades can happen at this price, then a
reasonably good approximation factor is achieved by our mechanism (see Section 5 for a detailed
discussion). One may also interpret our result as a “large market” result: the approximation factor
approaches 1 as we let the number of buyers and sellers in the market grow proportionally, since
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in that case the number of trades grows arbitrarily large. This is, to the best of our knowledge, the
first fixed price mechanism that is DSIC, SBB, and ex-post IR, and achieves a near-optimal gain
from trade under mild conditions on the size of the market.
1.2 Related Literature
The impossibility result of [16] proved that no two-sided mechanism can be simultaneously BIC,
IR, WBB, and optimise the social welfare even in the simple bilateral trade setting. Thus, many
subsequent works studied how it is possible to relax some of the constraints to achieve positive
results in the context of maximise the social welfare or the gain from trade.
In [3], a BIC mechanism is devised that approximates the expected gain from trade in bilateral
trade up to a factor of 1/e when the buyer’s distribution function satisfies a property known as
the monotone hazard rate condition. The mechanism of [3] is not DSIC since it achieves this ap-
proximation factor from a Bayes-Nash equilibrium by using the valuation of the seller in the price
offered to the buyer. It is also shown in the same work that no BIC mechanism can achieve an
approximation bound better than 2/e. Mechanisms that are DSIC/BIC, IR, and SBB have been
given for bilateral trade in [1]. In addition to this, the authors proposed a WBB mechanism for a
general class of markets known as combinatorial exchange markets.
Mechanisms for double auctions with near-optimal gain from trade have been previously pro-
posed for the prior-free setting. McAfee [14] has shown a WBB, DSIC, IR mechanism which achieves
a 1− 1/k-approximation to the optimal gain from trade if the number of trades under the optimum
allocation is k. This rate of convergence requires the prior distributions of traders to be bounded
above zero, over an interval [0, 1], but the mechanism is not a function of the priors. More recently,
Segal-Halevi et al. [20] devised a SBB mechanism with the same performance guarantee. The mech-
anisms of [14,20] are direct revelation mechanisms where the price depends crucially on the reported
valuations. In contrast, the goal in our present paper is to find out how much gain from trade can
be generated by means of setting a single fixed price, independent of the valuations of the players,
at which all agents trade. Such mechanisms have the advantage that they are conceptually simpler
and have a pricing scheme that is extremely easy to understand. They also can be implemented as
posted price mechanisms where buyers and sellers merely have to indicate whether they would be
willing to trade at the given price. Thus, they require a minimum amount of valuation revelation.
In [19], the authors present a mechanism that combines random sampling and random serial
dictatorship techniques which is IR, SBB and DSIC, and asymptotically approaches the optimum
gain from trade. Recently, [4] provides an IR, SBB, and BIC mechanism that achieves a constant
approximation to the best gain from trade achievable among the IR, WBB, and BIC mechanisms,
which is an alternative (more permissive) benchmark. Two recent papers by Feldman and Gonen
[10,9] study a multi-unit variant of double auctions for online advertising purposes. They design
in [10] IR, WBB, and DSIC mechanisms that well-approximate the gain from trade under certain
technical conditions, as a function of the number of trades under the optimum allocation. In [9]
they develop further mechanisms for an online variant of this setting, where additional sellers and
buyers may enter the market over time.
Our paper contributes to a recent line of computational work on market intermediation, in
which a mechanism is assumed to interact with both buyers and sellers of some good, or goods. The
objective is to maximise (or, approximately maximise) either revenue for the mechanism, or welfare
of the buyers/sellers. Deng et al. [7] study revenue maximisation, in a setting of multiple buyers
and sellers, with uncorrelated priors and a single type of item being traded. The same objective
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was studied by [8] yet in the prior-free model. Gerstgrasser et al. [11] also study the objective
of maximising expected revenue, in a setting where there is a small number of buyers and seller,
who have a prior distribution whose support size represents the complexity of instances of the
problem. In [11], this distribution is otherwise unrestricted, and in particular may be correlated.
Giannakopoulos et al. [12] study a similar double auction setting to the one studied here in Section 5:
there are multiple buyers and sellers and one kind of item, with unit supply and demand. Buyers
have a common prior distribution on their valuations, as do sellers. [12] study market intermediation
from the perspective of welfare maximisation, and revenue maximisation. Colini-Baldeschi et al. [6]
also study market intermediation, in the context of buyers and seller of a collection of heterogenous
items, aiming to maximise welfare and achieve a strong notion of budget balance.
In the context of social welfare in the economics literature it is often studied a setting in which the
valuation of the sellers and the buyers are independently drawn from identical regular distributions,
while satisfying IR and WBB. And in this setting the goal is to find an approximation of the optimal
social welfare as a function of the number of agents. [13] showed that duplicating the number of
agents by τ results in a market where the optimal IR, IC, WBB mechanism’s expected social welfare
approximation factor approaches 1 at a rate of O(log τ/τ2). [17] and [18] investigated a family of
non-IC double auctions, and study the inefficiency and the extent to which agents misreport their
valuations in these double auctions.
2 Preliminaries
As a general convention, we use [a] to denote the set {1, . . . , a}. We will use 1(X) to denote the
indicator function that maps to 1 if and only if event/fact X holds.
Double Auction Setting. In a double auction setting there are n buyers and m sellers. Initially, each
seller j ∈ [m] holds one item and has a valuation wj for it. The sellers are not interested in possess
more than one item. Each buyer i ∈ [n] is interested in obtaining no more than one item and has a
valuation vi for it. Moreover, they are indifferent among the different items.
The valuations of the buyers and the sellers are private knowledge, but they are independently
drawn from publicly known distributions f and g, where f is the probability distribution for the
valuation of a buyer and g is the probability distribution for the valuation of a seller. We treat f and
g as probability density functions. All the buyers share the same distribution f and all the sellers
share the same mass probability distribution g, but f and g may be distinct. Moreover, let G be the
corresponding cumulative distribution functions of g and let F¯ be the corresponding complementary
cumulative distribution function (or survival function) of f .
Given a double auction setting (n,m, f, g), our goal is to redistribute the items from the
sellers to the buyers. An allocation for a double auction setting (n,m, f, g) is a pair of vectors
(X,Y ) = ((X1, . . . ,Xn), (Y1, . . . , Ym)) such that all the elements X1, . . . ,Xn, Y1, . . . , Ym ∈ {0, 1},
and
∑
i∈[n]Xi+
∑
j∈[m] Yj = m. The set A represents the set of all allocations for the double auction
setting.
The redistribution of the items from sellers to buyers is done by running a mechanism M. A
mechanism receives input from the agents, and outputs an allocation (X,Y ) and a price p. The
allocation (X,Y ) and the price p represents the outcome of the mechanism M. Thus, an outcome
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is a tuple (X,Y , p). The price p represents how much a buyer has to pay to obtain an item and
how much a seller has to receive to sell her item.6
Agents are assumed to be utility maximisers. The utility is defined as the valuation for the
items that they possess with respect to the allocation vector, minus the payment charged by the
mechanism. Specifically, the utility of a buyer i will be uBi (X,Y , p) = (vi − p) ·Xi. Similarly, the
utility of a seller j will be uSj (X,Y , p) = wjYj + p · (1− Yj).
Furthermore, agents are assumed to be fully rational, so that they will strategically interact
with the mechanism to achieve their goal of maximising utility. Our goal is to design a mechanism
that is DSIC, IR, SBB (as defined in the introduction) such that the the gain from trade is high.
For an outcome (X,Y , p), the gain from trade GFT(X,Y , p) is defined as
GFT(X,Y , p) =
n∑
i=1
viXi +
m∑
j=1
wj(Yj − 1)
For a double auction setting (n,m, f, g), the expected optimal gain from trade is defined as
OPTn,m,f,g = Ev∼fn,w∼gm
[
max
{
n∑
i=1
viXi +
m∑
i=1
wj(Yj − 1)
∣∣∣∣∣ (X,Y ) ∈ A
}]
.
We will sometimes omit the subscript, as in those cases the instance being discussed will be clear
from context.
We say that a mechanism M α-approximates the optimal gain from trade for some α > 1 if and
only if OPT ≤ αE[GFT(X,Y , p)], where (X,Y , p) is the random allocation that the mechanism
generates, when valuations v and w are drawn from fn and gm respectively. Our goal is to find a
DSIC, ex-post IR, and SBB mechanism that α-approximates the optimal gain from trade for a low
α.
Bilateral Trade Setting. The bilateral trade setting is a special case of the double auction setting
where there is only one unit-demand buyer and one unit-supply seller. Thus, we can represent a
bilateral trade setting as a pair of valuation distribution function, one for the buyer f and one for
the seller g, i.e., (f, g). It is known that if a mechanism has to satisfy IR, DSIC, and SBB, then it
must be a fixed price mechanism [5], i.e., the mechanism fixes a price p a priori, and trade happens
if and only if both the buyer’s valuation is at least p and the seller’s valuation is at most p.
For a bilateral trade instance, the gain from trade of a fixed price mechanism with fixed price p
will be denoted by GFTf,g(p). That is,
GFTf,g(p) = Ev∼f,w∼g[max{0, v − w}1(w ≤ p ≤ v)].
Moreover, note that for the bilateral trade setting we can express OPTf,g as Ev∼f,w∼g[max{0, v−w}].
For the bilateral trade setting, the goal of this paper is to study how to set the price p such that
the gain from trade achieved by the fixed price mechanism with price p is as close as possible to the
optimal gain from trade. We will design fixed price mechanisms where the ratio between OPTf,g
and GFTf,g(p) is a function of the probability that the buyer has a value greater than the seller,
6 More generally, we may define the notion of a mechanism such that more complex pricing schemes are possible,
but our definition suffices for the mechanisms that we will define later in this paper.
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i.e., the provability that a trade is efficient. This probability will be represented by the parameter
r. Thus,
r = Prv∼f,w∼g[v ≥ w].
Due to space constraints, the proofs of various theorems and lemmas have been deferred to the
appendix.
3 An O(1/r)-Approximation Mechanism for Bilateral Trade
In the bilateral trade setting there is only one unit-demand buyer and one unit-supply seller. It can
be proven that if a mechanism has to satisfy IR, DSIC, and SBB, then it must be a fixed price
mechanism [5], i.e., the mechanism fixes a price p and posts it to the buyer and the seller. Trade
happens if and only if both the buyer’s valuation is at least p and the seller’s valuation is at most
p.
We will show in this section that there exists a fixed price mechanism that achieves an expected
gain from trade that is at least r/2 times the expected optimal gain from trade. In the fixed price
mechanism that we propose for this, the fixed price p is set such that Prv∼f [v ≤ p] = Prw∼g[w ≤ p].
The main theorem that we prove is thus as follows.
Theorem 3.1. Let (f, g) be a bilateral trade instance, let p ∈ R≥0 be any fixed price, and let q be
the minimum of Prv∼f [v ≥ p] and Prw∼g[w ≤ p]. Then,
1
q
GFTf,g(p) ≥ OPTf,g. (1)
Moreover, if p is chosen such that q is maximised (i.e., p is such that Prw∼g[w ≤ p] = Prv∼f [v ≥ p]),
it holds that
2
r
GFTf,g(p) ≥ OPTf,g. (2)
Note that this theorem strictly generalises McAfee’s result of [15], which states that in case the
seller’s median is less than the buyer’s median, then setting the price in between the medians of the
buyer and the seller results in a 2-approximation to the optimal gain from trade: If we take p to be
any price in between the median of the seller and the buyer, then q is at least 1/2, and (1) then
states that the gain from trade at fixed price p is at least half the optimal gain from trade.
4 Improving the Asymptotic Dependence on r
In this section, we show how it is possible to improve the approximation factor implementing a more
involved rule to determine the fixed price p. When the trading price p will be set with the new rule
the approximation factor will improve from 2/r to O(log(1/r)). Notice that when r is small, this is
a big improvement with respect to the approximation shown in the previous section. All logarithms
used in this section are to base 2.
Let us first give a high level description of how we determine the fixed price of the mechanism.
Let us consider any two points z and z′ such that Pr[v ≥ z] = 2Pr[v ≥ z′]. Let E be the event that
the buyer’s valuation exceeds z, and that the sellers valuation lies in between z and z′. Let FE be
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the complementary cumulative distribution function of the buyer conditioned on E and let GE be
the cumulative distribution function of the seller conditioned on E. We now see that on the interval
[z, z′], the function FE decreases from 1 to 1/2 and the function GE increases from 0 to 1. Thus,
the functions cross each other in [z, z′] at a value of at least 1/2, which means that the median of
the buyer exceeds the median of the seller when conditioning on E. Using Theorem 3.1, we thus
obtain that when conditioning on E there exists a fixed price that achieves a 2-approximation to
the optimal gain from trade.
Our mechanism works by showing that we can decompose “roughly” the entire probability space
into at most log(1/r) + 1 such events, so that choosing the best fixed price corresponding to each
of these events results into an O(log(1/r)) approximation to the optimal gain from trade. More
precisely, we show that there are two sets of roughly log(1/r) + 1 such events, and we prove that in
case one of these sets does not cover a fraction of the probability space that accounts for at least
1/2 of the optimal gain from trade, then the other set of events does. To determine the desired fixed
price, we can thus
1. first determine which of the two event sets “covers” a large part of the optimal gain from trade,
2. and subsequently select the best fixed price among the log(1/r) + 1 prices corresponding to the
event set.
The two event sets have the following properties: one of them excludes the part of the probability
space where the buyer’s complementary CDF is below the threshold r/2. The other one switches
the roles of the seller and buyer, and excludes the part of the probability space where the seller’s
CDF is below a the threshold r/2. From this property of the event sets (i.e., having these particular
thresholds on the tails of the two distributions), we are able to show that one of the event sets
covers a large part of the optimal gain from trade. We now proceed by making these ideas precise.
We first describe how we determine the price, which we denote by p∗, for a given instance
(f, g). In contrast with the last section, we assume (for convenience of exposition) without loss of
generality that f and g are continuous distributions without point masses, where we treat f and g
as probability density functions, and we let F and G be the corresponding cumulative distribution
functions. We write F to denote the buyer’s complementary cumulative distribution function 1−F .
Let r be the probability Prv∼f,w∼g[v ≥ w] of a trade being possible (as before). Let x be the value
such that F (x) = r/2 and let y be the value such that G(y) = r/2. We distinguish between two
cases.
– If Ev∼f,w∼g[(v − w)1(w ≤ v ∧ w > y)] ≥ OPTf,g/2, then let p
∗ be the price that achieves the
maximum gain from trade among the prices p1, . . . , p⌈log(2/r)⌉, where for i ∈ [⌈log(2/r)⌉], price
pi is such that
Prw∼g
[
w ≤ pi
∣∣∣∣ F−1
(
1
2i−1
)
≤ w ≤ F
−1
(
1
2i
)]
= Prv∼f
[
v > pi
∣∣∣∣ F−1
(
1
2i−1
)
≤ v
]
.
– Otherwise, let p∗ be the price that achieves the maximum gain from trade among the prices
p′1, . . . , p
′
⌈log(2/r)⌉, where for i ∈ [⌈log(2/r)⌉], price p
′
i is such that
Prv∼f
[
v > pi
∣∣∣∣ G−1
(
1
2i
)
≤ v ≤ G−1
(
1
2i−1
)]
= Prw∼g
[
w ≤ pi
∣∣∣∣ G−1
(
1
2i
)
≤ w
]
,
where we define G−1(1) =∞ if there exists no point t ∈ R≥0 such that G(t) = 1.
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This completes the definition of the fixed price p∗.
First we prove that if the first of the two cases does not apply (i.e., if the inequality Ev∼f,w∼g[(v−
w)1(w ≤ v ∧ w > y)] ≤ OPTf,g/2 does not hold), then the symmetric inequality Ev∼f,w∼g[(v −
w)1(w ≤ v ∧ w < x)] ≤ OPTf,g/2 holds for the second case.
Lemma 4.1. If Ev∼f,w∼g[(v − w)1(w ≤ v ∧ w > y)] > OPTf,g/2, then Ew∼f,v∼g[(v − w)1(w ≤
v ∧ v < x)] ≤ OPTf,g/2.
Proof. It suffices to prove that the events w ≤ v ∧w > y and w ≤ v ∧ v < x are disjoint, since then
the value OPTf,g can be decomposed into three terms:
OPTf,g = Ev∼f,w∼g[(v − w)1(w ≤ v)1(w > y)] +Ev∼f,w∼g[(v − w)1(w ≤ v)1(w < x)]
+Ev∼f,w∼g[(v − w)1(w ≤ v)1(v ≤ y ∧ w ≥ x)],
from which it follows that at least one of the first two terms does not exceed OPTf,g/2, which proves
the claim.
In order to show that w ≤ v ∧ w > y is disjoint from w ≤ v ∧ v < x, in turn it suffices to prove
that y ≥ x. To see this, suppose for contradiction that y < x. Then we can derive
Prv∼f,w∼g[w ≤ v] ≤ Prv∼f,w∼g[w ≤ x ∩w ≤ v] +Prv∼f,w∼g[w > x ∩ w ≤ v]
≤ Prw∼g[w ≤ x] +Prv∼f [v > x]
< Prw∼g[w ≤ x] +Prv∼f [v > y]
=
r
2
+
r
2
= r,
which contradicts the definition r = Prv∼f,w∼g[w ≤ v]. ⊓⊔
With the above lemma in mind, we can prove our intended approximation factor for price p∗.
Theorem 4.1. Let (f, g) be any bilateral trade instance, and let p∗ be the price for (f, g), as defined
above. It holds that
OPTf,g ≤ 4 log
(⌈
2
r
⌉)
GFTf,g(p
∗).
Proof. We divide the proof into two cases, corresponding to the case distinction by which p∗ is
defined. In the first case, it holds that Ev∼f,w∼g[(v−w)1(w ≤ v∧w > y)] ≤ OPTf,g/2. This implies
that Ev∼f,w∼g[(v − w)1(w ≤ v ∧ w ≤ y)] ≥
OPTf,g
2 . For i ∈ [⌈log(2/r)⌉], let E(i) denote the event
F
−1
(
1
2i−1
)
≤ w ≤ F
−1
(
1
2i
)
∧ F
−1
(
1
2i−1
)
≤ v,
and let fE(i) and gE(i) be the probability distributions f and g conditioned on the event E(i).
Moreover, we define FE(i) as the complementary cumulative distribution function of fE(i) and GE(i)
as the cumulative distribution function of gE(i).
By definition, the price p∗ is the price among the prices {pi : i ∈ [⌈log(2/r)⌉]} that achieves
the highest gain from trade. We proceed to show that we can write the expectation on the left
hand side as a convex combination of ⌈log(2/r)⌉ values T1, . . . , T⌈log(2/r)⌉ (and 0), such that Ti ≤
2GFTfE(i),gE(i)(pi) for all i ∈ [⌈log(2/r)⌉]. Define
Ti = Ev∼f,w∼g [(v − w)1(w ≤ v) | E(i)] = OPTfE(i),gE(i).
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We prove first that Ti ≤ 2GFTfE(i),gE(i)(pi) for i ∈ [⌈log(2/r)⌉]. We see that the function FE(i) is
at least 1/2 on the interval Ii = [G
−1
(1/2i−1), G
−1
(1/2i)], because F is in the range [1/2i−1, 1/2i]
on interval Ii. The function GE(i) crosses FE(i) in Ii, and the price pi is, per definition, exactly the
point in Ii where the two functions are equal, i.e., the point pi ∈ Ii such that FE(i)(pi) = GE(i)(pi).
Therefore, 1/2 ≤ FE(i)(pi) = GE(i)(pi).
Now we apply the first part of Theorem 3.1 to the instance (fE(i), gE(i)) with price pi. Because
of the above inequality, we know that the value of q in Theorem 3.1 is at least 1/2, so we obtain
GFTfE(i),gE(i)(pi) ≥ (1/2)OPTfE(i),gE(i) = (1/2)Ti, as we wanted to show. We also derive that
Ev∼f,w∼g[(v − w)1(w ≤ v ∧ w ≤ y)]
≤
⌈log(2/r)⌉∑
i=1
Pr
[
F
−1
(
1
2i−1
)
≤ w ≤ F
−1
(
1
2i
)
∧ F
−1
(
1
2i−1
)
≤ v
]
Ti
=
⌈log(2/r)⌉∑
i=1
Prv∼f,w∼g[E(i)]Ti,
is indeed a convex combination of T1, . . . , T⌈log(2/r)⌉ (and 0). (Note that the inequality in the above
derivation is an equality in case log(2/r) is an integer.) It follows that
OPTf,g/2 ≤ 2
⌈log(2/r)⌉∑
i=1
Prv∼f,w∼g[E(i)]GFTfE(i),gE(i)(pi)
= 2
⌈log(2/r)⌉∑
i=1
Prv∼f,w∼g[E(i)]Ev∼f,w∼g [(v − w)1(w ≤ pi ≤ v) | E(i)]
= 2
⌈log(2/r)⌉∑
i=1
Ev∼f,w∼g[(v − w)1(w ≤ pi ≤ v)1(E(i))]
≤ 2
⌈log(2/r)⌉∑
i=1
Ev∼f,w∼g[(v − w)1(w ≤ pi ≤ v)] ≤ 2
⌈log(2/r)⌉∑
i=1
GFTf,g(pi)
≤ 2 log
(⌈
2
r
⌉)
max
{
GFTf,g(pi) : i ∈
[
log
(⌈
2
r
⌉)]}
= 2 log
(⌈
2
r
⌉)
GFTf,g(p
∗),
which proves the desired result for our first case.
For the second case, it holds that Ev∼f,w∼g[(v − w)1(w ≤ v ∧ w > y)] > OPTf,g/2. Then by
Lemma 4.1, Ev∼f,w∼g[(v − w)1(w ≤ v ∧ v < x)] ≤ (1/2)OPTf,g. The analysis of this second case is
from this point entirely analogous to that of the first case. ⊓⊔
Note that the approximation bound of 2/r that we established in the first section is better
than the approximation bound of 4⌈log(2/r)⌉ when r is roughly greater than 0.05. At r = 0.05, the
approximation factor 4⌈log(2/r)⌉ already takes a value around 20. Hence, the result of this section is
intended to provide theoretical insight into how the approximability of the gain from trade depends
on r asymptotically.
An (asymptotically) matching lower bound is given in the appendix of [2], which shows that
Θ(log(1/r)) is asymptotically the best possible factor by which the optimal gain from trade that
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can always be approximated. We provide in Appendix A another independently discovered example
of such a bilateral trade instance, in which the probability distributions of the buyer and the seller
are discrete rather than continuous. Our example additionally shows that the approximation factor
achievable by a fixed price mechanism can be no better than Ω(1/N), where N is the number of
points in the support of the distributions.
5 A Fixed Price Double Auction
We now turn to the double auction setting. Recall that in this setting there are n ≥ 1 buyers and
m ≥ 1 sellers. The sellers each hold one item, and neither the buyers or the sellers are interested in
holding more than one item. As before, we refer to f for the probability distribution function from
which the buyers’ valuations are independently drawn, and to g for the probability distribution from
which the sellers’ valuations are independently drawn. We denote the (random) valuation of buyer
i ∈ [n] by vi and the (random) valuation of seller j ∈ [m] by wj. See Section 2 for the definition.
In order to present the definition of a fixed price mechanism for the double auction setting, let
us first introduce the concept of feasible pair.
Definition 5.1. Let (n,m, f, g) be an instance of a double auction setting, let (v,w) ∈ Rn×Rm be
a valuation profile for the buyers and sellers, and let p ∈ R≥0. We call (i, j) ∈ [n]× [m] a feasible
pair with respect to profile (v,w) and fixed price p iff vi ≥ p ≥ wj.
Now, we can define a fixed price mechanism as follows.
Definition 5.2. We define a fixed price mechanism M for a double auction setting (n,m, f, g) as a
direct revelation mechanism for which there is a price p such that the mechanism selects a uniform
random maximal subset of feasible pairs with respect to reported profile (v,w) and p, and makes
these pairs trade with each other. Moreover, for every selected trading pair (i, j), the mechanism
makes buyer i pay an amount of p to seller j. We refer to p as the price of M.
This is perhaps the most natural generalization of the notion of a fixed price mechanism that one may
think of. Please note that in a fixed price mechanism with price p, given a reported valuation profile
(v,w), the number of pairs that trade is always the minimum of |{vi : vi ≥ p}| and |{wi : wi ≤ p}|.
It is easy to show that fixed price mechanisms clearly satisfy the three basic properties that we
want:
Theorem 5.1. For every double auction setting, every fixed price mechanism is ex-post IR, SBB,
and DSIC.
Fixed price mechanisms have some additional advantanges.
– First, a fixed price mechanism is entirely symmetric: Each seller has the same expected utility,
and each buyer has the same expected utility. The mechanism treats buyers with the same
valuation entirely symetrically and does not break ties in favour of one over the other. This
symmetricity is desirable from the point of view of fairness.
– Secondly, the mechanism does not require the agents to fully reveal their entire valuation, since
it can be implemented as a two-sided sequential posted price mechanism [5]. Under such an
implementation, the mechanisms goes over the buyers and sellers one by one. It proposes a
take-it-or-leave-it price (equal to p, in this case) to each buyer and seller, which the buyers and
sellers can choose to accept or reject. As soon as an accepting (buyer,seller)-pair is found, the
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mechanism lets this pair trade at price p. Taking a uniform random order of buyers and sellers
will result in a random subset of feasible pairs who trade at price p, i.e., it will result in an
implementation of the fixed price mechanism with price p. Under such an implementation, each
buyer and seller has to reveal only one bit of information, which indicates whether her valuation
is above or below p.
We aim to design a simple fixed price mechanism for which the gain from trade is a good
approximation to the optimal gain from trade. The mechanism we use is as follows.
Definition 5.3. Given an instance (n,m, f, g) of a double auction setting, let p be the price such
that nF (p) = mG(p). We refer to the fixed price mechanism with price p as the balanced fixed price
double auction. For ease of presentation, we refer to F (p) as qB and we refer to G(p) as qS. We
denote by GFT(p) the expected gain from trade achieved by the balanced fixed price double auction,
and we denote by #T the expected number of trades that the balanced fixed price double auction
generates.
Observe that the balanced fixed price double auction is a generalization of the mechanism of The-
orem 3.1 that achieves for the bilateral trade setting a 2/r-approximation of the optimal gain from
trade. We note that the value #T is by definition equal to nqB = mqS .
The main result we prove in this section is as follows.
Theorem 5.2. For all ǫ ∈ [0, 1], with probability at least 1 − 2/e#Tǫ
2/2, the balanced fixed price
double auction achieves a gain from trade that is at least (1 − ǫ) times the expected optimal gain
from trade.
Note that #T , the expected number of trades of the balanced fixed price double auction, needs to
exceed 2 ln(2)/ǫ2 by any constant for the above theorem to yield a constant approximation guarantee.
The value #T can be regarded as a property of the instance (n,m, f, g) on which the mechanism is
run, and is equal to the value where the functions nF and mG cross each other. The requirement
on #T is reasonably mild: For example, the above theorem says that when #T is at least 10, the
balanced fixed price double auction yields an expected gain from trade that is a (< 4)-approximation
to the optimal gain from trade, by taking ǫ ≈ 0.61 (since (1 − 2/e0.61
2 ·5) · (1 − 0.61) > 0.25). The
theorem provides a constant approximation ratio for all instances where #T > 2 ln(2) ≈ 1.38, but
grows unbounded as #T approaches 2 ln 2 from above.
There is an interesting interpretation of this theorem in terms of large markets: Observe that in-
creasing the number of buyers or sellers in the market also increases #T . In particular, by increasing
both the number of buyers and the number of sellers simultaneously, #T grows unboundedly. From
our theorem we may therefore infer that the balanced fixed price double auction approximation
approximates the gain from trade by a factor that goes to 1 as the market grows.
To prove the desired approximation property of the balanced fixed price double auction, we note
that due to symmetry, we may assume that under the optimum allocation every buyer has the same
a priori probability of trading with a seller, and every seller has the same a priori probability of
trading with a buyer. This motivates the following definition.
Definition 5.4. For a double auction setting (n,m, f, g) we define the values qS as the probability
that any buyer receives an item under the optimum allocation, and we define qS as the probability
that any seller loses her item under the optimum allocation. We define the prices pB and pS as
the prices closest to p such that F (pB) = qB and G(pS) = qS. That is: pB is such that a buyers’
probability of her valuation exceeding pB is equal to the probability of obtaining an item under the
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pm ·G (sellers)
n · F (buyers)
n
m
nqB = mqS
Fig. 1. The graphs of the functions n · F and m ·G are shown. They cross at price p.
optimum allocation, and if there multiple such prices then pB is defined as the unique one closest
to p. Likewise, pS is such that a sellers’ probability of her valuation being at most pS is equal to the
probability of losing her item under the optimum allocation. Lastly, we let OPT denote the expected
gain from trade achieved by the optimum allocation.
The values GFT(p), OPT, #T , p, qB, qS , p, qB, and qS all depend (like r) on the instance (n,m, f, g).
We will leave this dependence implicit, as throughout this section there will be no ambiguity about
the instance of the double auction setting that is being discussed.
Lemma 5.1. For every instance (n,m, f, g) of a double auction setting, the following property of
the optimal allocation is satisfied.
nqB = mqS.
The following lemma states that our price p always lies in between pB and pS.
Lemma 5.2. For every instance (n,m, f, g) of a double auction setting, pB ≥ p ≥ pS or pS ≥ p ≥
pB.
The following lemma provides a useful bound on OPT
Lemma 5.3. For every instance (n,m, f, g) of a double auction setting, it holds that
OPT ≤ nqBE[v1 | v1 ≥ p
B]−mqSE[w1 | w1 ≤ p
S].
We will use the following technical Lemma to bound OPT further.
Lemma 5.4. For every instance (n,m, f, g) of a double auction setting, it holds that
nqBE[v1 | v1 ≥ p
B ]−mqSE[w1 | w1 ≤ p
S] ≤ nqBE[v1 | v1 ≥ p]−mq
SE[w1 | w1 ≤ p]
We can now prove our main approximation result for the balanced fixed price double auction.
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Proof (of Theorem 5.2). Let us define the following random variables: Bi is a random variable that
is equal to 1 if vi ≥ p and 0 otherwise, similarly, Sj is a random variable that is equal to 1 if wj ≤ p
and 0 otherwise. Now, let B =
∑
iBi and S =
∑
j Sj. Moreover, let B
∗
i denote the event that i
trades under the balanced fixed price double auction, and similarly let B∗j be the event that j trades
under the balanced fixed price double auction. Denote by E the event that the balanced fixed price
double auction lets at least (1 − ǫ)nqB = (1 − ǫ)mqS pairs of buyers and sellers trade. That is E
denotes the event that B ≥ (1 − ǫ)nqB ∧ S ≥ (1 − ǫ)mqS . First, we derive the following bound on
the gain from trade of the balanced fixed price double auction conditioned on E.
E

 n∑
i=1
(vi − p)1(B
∗
i ) +
m∑
j=1
(p− wj)1(S
∗
j )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ E


=
n∑
i=1
E [vi − p | E ∧B
∗
i ]Pr [B
∗
i | E] +
m∑
j=1
E
[
p− wj
∣∣ E ∧ S∗j ]Pr [S∗j ∣∣ E]
=
n∑
i=1
E [vi − p | vi ≥ p]Pr [B
∗
i | E] +
m∑
j=1
E [p− wj | wj ≤ p]Pr
[
S∗j
∣∣ E]
≥
n∑
i=1
E [vi − p | vi ≥ p]
nqB(1− ǫ)
n
+
m∑
j=1
E [p− wj | wj ≤ p]
mqS(1 − ǫ)
m
= nE [v1 − p | v1 ≥ p] q
B(1− ǫ) +mE [p− w1 | w1 ≤ p] q
S(1− ǫ).
= nE [v1 | v1 ≥ p] q
B(1− ǫ)−mE [w1 | w1 ≤ p] q
S(1− ǫ).
We bound as follows the probability of the event E happening.
Pr[E] = 1−Pr[B < (1− ǫ)nqB ∨ S < (1− ǫ)mqS]
≥ 1−Pr[B < (1− ǫ)nqB ]−Pr[S < (1− ǫ)mqS ]
≥ 1−
2
enq
Bǫ2/2
≥ 1−
2
e#Tǫ2/2
The second inequality follows from applying a standard Chernoff bound, which can be done since
B and S are sums of {0, 1} independent random variables.
We conclude that with probability at least 1−2/e#Tǫ
2/2 the mechanism obtains at least (1−ǫ)#T
trades at price p. Thus, using Lemmas 5.3 and 5.4 we conclude that with probability at least
1− 2/e#Tǫ
2/2 the gain from trade of the balanced fixed price double auction is at least
(1− ǫ)(nqBE[v1 | v1 ≥ p]−mq
SE[w1 | w1 ≤ p]) ≥ (1− ǫ)OPT,
which completes the proof. ⊓⊔
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A Asymptotically Tight Lower Bound on the Gain From Trade Achievable by
Fixed Brice Mechanisms
The following family of examples show how the ratio between the gain from trade of the optimal
gain from trade and the best gain from trade achievable by a fixed price mechanism can be as high
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as Ω(log(1/r)), and moreover can grow linearly with the support size of the buyer’s and seller’s
distributions.
Example A.1. Let N ∈ N and let ǫ be any number in [5/36, 1). Denote by fN and gN the buyer’s and
seller’s valuation distribution, and let the supports of these distributions be respectively supp (fN ) =
{1 + ǫ, 2 + ǫ, . . . , N + ǫ} and supp (gN ) = [N ]. Let α =
∑N−1
x=0 10
−x = 109 (1 − 10
−N ). Then, for all
w ∈ supp (gN ) , gN (w) := 10
w−N/α and for all v ∈ supp (fN ) , f(v) := 10
−(v−1−ǫ)/α. Figure 2
provides an illustration of (f5, g5).
1 1 + ǫ 2 2 + ǫ 3 3 + ǫ 4 4 + ǫ 5 5 + ǫ
f(x)
g(x)
x
Fig. 2. A representation of the above example for N = 5. The probability masses of f5 are displayed in blue while
those of f5 are displayed in red.
The remainder of this section comprises a proof our claimed lower bounds on the achievable
approximation factor, for the above family of examples. Consider N to as a fixed natural number
for the remaining part of this section. The distributions of fN and gN are discretised versions of
exponential distributions. The role of the scaling parameter α is solely to make sure that they are
feasible distributions, i.e., that the probability masses sum up to 1. Observe that for the buyer (and
symmetrically, for the seller) it holds that for any v ∈ supp (fN ), fN (v) >
∑
v′∈supp(fN ):v′>v
fN (v
′),
i.e., the probability mass at any point v in the support of fN is larger than the total probability
mass of all points v′ > v.
Observe that for the above example we have that the gain from trade achieved by a fixed price
mechanism with fixed price p satisfies
GFTfN ,gN (p) ≥
101−N
α2
p∑
w=1
N∑
v=p
(v + ǫ− w)10w−v
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and the optimum gain from trade equals
OPTfN ,gN =
101−N
α2
N∑
w=1
N∑
v=w
(v + ǫ− w)10w−v .
We will first show that the ratio GFTfN ,gN (p)/OPTfN ,gN can be as bad as 4/N , where N is the
support size of fN and gN .
Lemma A.1. For any w ∈ {1, . . . , p}, p ∈ [N ], and ǫ ≥ 5/36, it holds that
N∑
v=p
(v + ǫ− w)10w−v ≤ 2(p + ǫ− w)10v−p.
Proof. Let z = p− x. Then we derive:
N∑
v=p
(v + ǫ− w)10w−v = (p+ ǫ− w)10w−p +
N−p∑
ℓ=1
(p+ ǫ− w + ℓ)10w−p−ℓ
= (z + ǫ)10−z +
N−p∑
ℓ=1
(z + ǫ+ ℓ)10−z−ℓ.
In the first equality we took y = p out of the sum and expressed the remaining terms of the sum as
p + ℓ. To prove the statement it is enough to show that the last summation of the last expression
is at most (z + ǫ)10−z.
N−p∑
ℓ=1
(z + ǫ+ ℓ)10−z−ℓ ≤ 10−z
(
∞∑
ℓ=1
(z + ǫ+ ℓ)10−ℓ
)
= 10−z
(
1
92
(9(z + ǫ) + 10)
)
.
Now observe that the following equivalences hold.
10−z
(
z + ǫ+ 10/9
9
)
≤ (z + ǫ)⇐⇒ z + ǫ ≥
5
36
⇐⇒ ǫ ≥
5
36
− z.
Since z = p − w and w ≤ p, it holds that z ≥ 0. Hence, any choice of ǫ ≥ 5/36 satisfies the
inequality. ⊓⊔
Lemma A.2. For any p ∈ [N ] and ǫ ≥ 5/36,
p∑
w=1
N∑
v=p
(v + ǫ− w)10w−v ≤ 4ǫ.
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Proof.
p∑
w=1
N∑
v=p
(v + ǫ− w)10w−v ≤
p∑
w=1
2(p+ ǫ− w)10w−p
= 2ǫ+ 2
p−1∑
w=1
2(p+ ǫ− w)10w−p
≤ 2ǫ+ 2
∞∑
w=1
2(p+ ǫ− w)10w−p
= 2ǫ+ 2
(
9ǫ+ 10
92
)
.
As showed in Lemma A.1,
9ǫ+ 10
92
≤ ǫ⇐⇒ ǫ ≥
5
36
.
⊓⊔
The following lemma gives an upper bound on the expected optimum gain from trade.
Lemma A.3. For all N ∈ N,
N∑
w=1
N∑
v=w
(v + ǫ− w)10w−x ≥ Nǫ.
Proof. If we only sum on v’s that are equal to w, we certainly lower-bound the expression and get
that
N∑
w=1
N∑
v=w
(v + ǫ− w)10v−w ≥
N∑
w=1
ǫ = Nǫ.
⊓⊔
The next proposition follows from Lemmas A.2 and A.3.
Proposition A.1. Let (fN , gN ) be the defined as in Example A.1. For every fixed price p, the ratio
of OPTfN ,gN and GFTfN ,gN (p) is at least N/4, where N is the support size of f and g.
It remains to show that N ∈ Ω(log(1/r)). This follows from the following bound on r.
Lemma A.4.
N ≥ log
(
1
r
)
.
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Proof. The value r is defined as the probability of the buyer’s valuation exceeding that of the seller.
Therefore, we can write r as follows.
r =
∑
v∈supp(fN )
∑
w∈supp(gN ):w<v
f(v)g(w)
=
1
(100/81)(1 − 10−N )2
101−N+ǫ
∑
(v,w)∈[N ]2:w≤v
10w−v
≥
81
100
101−N+ǫ
N−1∑
i=0
(N − i)10−i
=
81
100
101−N+ǫ
10
81
(9N + 10−N + 1)
≥
1
10
101−N+ǫ
= 10−N+ǫ.
Therefore, 1/r ≤ 10N−ǫ and log10(1/r) ≤ N − ǫ ≤ N . ⊓⊔
Combining the above proposition and lemma, we conclude that for every fixed price p, the ratio
OPTfN ,gN/GFTfN ,gN (p) is at least Ω(log(1/r)).
B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
Without loss of generality, we assume that the distributions f and g are discrete, and we write
supp(f) and supp(g) to denote the supports of f and g respectively.
The optimal gain from trade can be written as the following summation.
OPTf,g =
∑
(v,w)∈supp(f)×supp(g):v≥w
f(v)g(w)(v −w)
We split this summation up into three parts: We define MGFTLf,g(p) as∑
(v,w)∈supp(f)×supp(g):w≤v<p
f(v)g(w)(v − w),
and we define MGFTRf,g(p) as∑
(v,w)∈supp(f)×supp(g):p<w≤v
f(v)g(w)(v − w),
so that OPTf,g = MGFTLf,g(p) + GFTf,g(p) + MGFTRf,g(p).
7 Moreover, we split GFTf,g(p) up
into two parts: We define GFTLf,g(p) as∑
(v,w)∈supp(f)×supp(g):w≤p≤v
f(v)g(w)(p − w) ≤ q
∑
w∈supp(g):w≤p
g(w)(p − w)
7 We note that “MGFTL and MGFTR” are intended to stand for “Missed Gain From Trade on the Left” and “Missed
Gain From Trade on the Right”, respectively.
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and we define GFTRf,g(p) as∑
(v,w)∈supp(f)×supp(g):v≤p≤w
f(v)g(w)(v − p) ≤ q
∑
v∈supp(f):p≤v
f(v)(v − p),
so that GFTf,g(p) = GFTLf,g(p) + GFTRf,g(p).
Using this fact, we derive the following.
MGFTLf,g(p) =
∑
(v,w)∈supp(f)×supp(g):w≤v<p
f(v)g(w)(v − w)
≤
∑
(v,w)∈supp(f)×supp(g):w≤v<p
f(v)g(w)(p − w)
=
∑
w∈supp(g):w≤p
g(w)(p − w)
∑
v∈supp(f):w≤v<p
f(v)
≤
∑
w∈supp(g):w<p
g(w)(p − w)(1 − q)
=
1− q
q
GFTLf,g(p),
and analogously, we obtain
MGFTRf,g(p) =
∑
(v,w)∈supp(f)×supp(g):p<w≤v
f(v)g(w)(v − w)
≤
∑
(v,w)∈supp(f)×supp(g):p<w≤v
f(v)g(w)(w − p)
=
∑
v∈supp(f):v≥p
f(v)(v − p)
∑
w∈supp(g):p<w≤v
g(w)
≤
∑
v∈supp(f):v≥p
f(v)(v − p)(1− q)
=
1− q
q
GFTRf,g(p).
Therefore,
OPTf,g = MGFTLf,g(p) + GFTf,g(p) +MGFTRf,g(p)
≤
1− q
q
GFTLf,g(p) + GFTf,g(p) +
1− q
q
GFTRf,g(p)
=
(
1− q
q
+ 1
)
GFTf,g(p)
=
1
q
GFTf,g(p),
which establishes (1). To obtain (2), set p such that q is maximized, and note that
r = Prv∼f,w∼g[v ≥ w]
= Prv∼f,w∼g[w ≤ v ≤ p] +Prv∼f,w∼g[w ≤ p ≤ v] +Prv∼f,w∼g[p ≤ w ≤ v]
≤ q(1− q) + q2 + q(1− q)
≤ 2q.
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Therefore,
OPTf,g ≤
1
q
GFTf,g(p) ≤
2
r
GFTf,g(p),
which establishes (2).
B.2 Proof of Theorem 4.1
We divide the proof into two cases, corresponding to the case distinction by which p∗ is defined. In
the first case, it holds that Ev∼f,w∼g[(v − w)1(w ≤ v ∧w > y)] ≤ OPTf,g/2. This implies that:
Ev∼f,w∼g[(v − w)1(w ≤ v ∧ w ≤ y)] ≥
OPTf,g
2
.
For i ∈ [⌈log(2/r)⌉], let E(i) denote the event
G
−1
(
1
2i−1
)
≤ w ≤ G
−1
(
1
2i
)
∧G
−1
(
1
2i−1
)
≤ v,
and let fE(i) and gE(i) be the probability distributions f and g conditioned on the event E(i).
Moreover, we define FE(i) as the complementary cumulative distribution function of fE(i) and GE(i)
as the complementary cumulative distribution function of gE(i).
By definition, the price p∗ is the price among the prices {pi : i ∈ [⌈log(2/r)⌉]} that achieves
the highest gain from trade. We proceed to show that we can write the expectation on the left
hand side as a convex combination of ⌈log(2/r)⌉ values T1, . . . T⌈log(2/r)⌉ (and 0), such that Ti ≤
2GFTfE(i),gE(i)(pi) for all i ∈ [⌈log(2/r)⌉]. Define
Ti = Ev∼f,w∼g
[
(v − w)1(w ≤ v)
∣∣∣∣ F−1
(
1
2i−1
)
≤ w ≤ F
−1
(
1
2i
)
∧ F
−1
(
1
2i−1
)
≤ v
]
= OPTfE(i),gE(i).
We prove first that Ti ≤ 2GFTfE(i),gE(i)(pi) for i ∈ [⌈log(2/r)⌉]. We see that the function FE(i) is
at least 1/2 on the interval Ii = [G
−1
(1/2i−1), G
−1
(1/2i)], because F is in the range [1/2i−1, 1/2i]
on interval Ii. The function GE(i) crosses FE(i) in Ii, and the price pi is, per definition, exactly the
point in Ii where the two functions are equal, i.e., the point pi ∈ Ii such that FE(i)(pi) = GE(i)(pi).
Therefore,
1
2
≤ FE(i)(pi) = GE(i)(pi)
Now we apply the first part of Theorem 3.1 to the instance (fE(i), gE(i)) with price pi. Because of
the above inequality, we know that the value of q in Theorem 3.1 is at least 1/2, so we obtain:
GFTfE(i),gE(i)(pi) ≥
1
2
OPTfE(i),gE(i) =
1
2
Ti,
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as we wanted to show. We also derive that
Ev∼f,w∼g[(v − w)1(w ≤ v ∧ w ≤ y)]
≤
⌈log(2/r)⌉∑
i=1
Pr
[
F
−1
(
1
2i−1
)
≤ w ≤ F
−1
(
1
2i
)
∧ F
−1
(
1
2i−1
)
≤ v
]
Ti
=
⌈log(2/r)⌉∑
i=1
Prv∼f,w∼g[E(i)]Ti,
is indeed a convex combination of T1, . . . , T⌈log(2/r)⌉ (and 0). (Note that the inequality in the above
derivation is an equality in case log(2/r) is an integer.) It follows that
OPTf,g/2 ≤ 2
⌈log(2/r)⌉∑
i=1
Prv∼f,w∼g[E(i)]GFTfE(i),gE(i)(pi)
= 2
⌈log(2/r)⌉∑
i=1
Prv∼f,w∼g[E(i)]Ev∼f,w∼g [(v − w)1(w ≤ pi ≤ v) | E(i)]
= 2
⌈log(2/r)⌉∑
i=1
Ev∼f,w∼g[(v − w)1(w ≤ pi ≤ v)1(E(i))]
≤ 2
⌈log(2/r)⌉∑
i=1
Ev∼f,w∼g[(v − w)1(w ≤ pi ≤ v)]
≤ 2
⌈log(2/r)⌉∑
i=1
GFTf,g(pi)
≤ 2 log
(⌈
2
r
⌉)
max
{
GFTf,g(pi) : i ∈
[
log
(⌈
2
r
⌉)]}
= 2 log
(⌈
2
r
⌉)
GFTf,g(p
∗),
which proves the desired result for our first case.
For the second case, it holds that Ev∼f,w∼g[(v − w)1(w ≤ v ∧ w > y)] > OPTf,g/2. Then by
Lemma 4.1,
Ev∼f,w∼g[(v − w)1(w ≤ v ∧ v < x)] ≤
OPTf,g
2
The analysis of this second case is from this point entirely analogous to that of the first case.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 5.1
Let p be the fixed price at which the mechanism trades. If the valuation of a buyer is less than p,
the buyer has a negative expected utility if she reports more than p, and otherwise she has a utility
of 0. If the valuation of a buyer is at least p then reporting anything above p will yield her the
same expected non-negative utility, and bidding below p will yield her a utility of 0. A symmetric
argument holds for the sellers. Thus, for all agents there is never incentive to misreport her valuation,
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which proves the DSIC property. Moreover, an agent’s expected valuation is always non-negative
when she bids truthfully, which proves the ex-post IR property. Lastly, since for every trading pair,
the seller receives exactly the amount paid by the buyer, so the SBB property is trivially satisfied.
B.4 Proof of Lemma 5.1
Note that nqB expresses the expected number of buyers that trade under the optimum allocation,
and mqS expresses the expected number of sellers that trade under the optimum allocation. Since
the number of buyers that trade is equal to the number of sellers that trade for every valuation
profile, these expected values must be equal.
B.5 Proof of Lemma 5.2
This proof is by contradiction. Let us separately examine the two cases that we want to rule out.
First, assume by contradiction that pB > p and pS > p. Then, it holds that qB = F (p) ≥
F (pB) = qB and qS = G(pS) ≥ G(p) = qb. Thus, nqB ≥ nqB = mqS ≥ mqS = nqS, where the
first equality holds by Lemma 5.1. Hence, qS = qS , but by definition of pS that means that pS = p
which is a contradiction.
Similarly, assume by contradiction that pB < p and pS < p. Then, it holds that qB = F (p) ≤
F (pB) = qB and qS = G(pS) ≤ G(p) = qb. Thus, nqB ≤ nqB = mqS ≤ mqS = nqB , where the
first equality holds by Lemma 5.1. Hence, qS = qS , but by definition of pS that means that pS = p
which is a contradiction.
B.6 Proof of Lemma 5.3
Let the notation i ↔ j denote the event that buyer i trades with seller j under the optimum
allocation. The following is an upper bound on the optimal gain from trade.
OPT =
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
E[(vi − wj)1(i↔ j)]
=
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
E[vi1(i↔ j)]−
m∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
E[wj1(i↔ j)]. (3)
We may rewrite the inner summation of the first term of (3) as follows.
m∑
j=1
E[vi1(i↔ j)] = E

vi m∑
j=1
1(i↔ j)


= E

vi1

 m∨
j=1
i↔ j




= E

vi
∣∣∣∣∣∣
m∨
j=1
i↔ j

Pr

 m∨
j=1
i↔ j

 .
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Analogously, for the inner summation of the second term of (3) we obtain
n∑
i=1
E[wj1(i↔ j)] = E
[
wj
∣∣∣∣∣
n∨
i=1
i↔ j
]
Pr
[
n∨
i=1
i↔ j
]
.
Plugging these two equalities into (3), we see that
OPT =
n∑
i=1
E

vi
∣∣∣∣∣∣
m∨
j=1
i↔ j

Pr

 m∨
j=1
i↔ j

− m∑
j=1
E
[
wj
∣∣∣∣∣
n∨
i=1
i↔ j
]
E
[
n∨
i=1
i↔ j
]
=
n∑
i=1
qBE

vi
∣∣∣∣∣∣
m∨
j=1
i↔ j

 − m∑
j=1
qSE
[
wj
∣∣∣∣∣
n∨
i=1
i↔ j
]
= nqBE

v1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
m∨
j=1
1↔ j

−mqSE
[
w1
∣∣∣∣∣
n∨
i=1
i↔ 1
]
.
Now observe that the probability of the events
(∨m
j=1 1↔ j
)
and (v1 ≥ p
B) are both equal to
qB by definition. Since the second event has the highest expected value among all events that occur
with probability qB, it must be that
E

v1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
m∨
j=1
1↔ j

 ≤ E[v1 | v1 ≥ pB].
Symetrically, it also holds that
E
[
w1
∣∣∣∣∣
n∨
i=1
i↔ 1
]
≥ E[w1 | w1 ≤ p
S].
Thus, the claim follows.
B.7 Proof of Lemma 5.4
By Lemma 5.2 we know that either pB ≥ p ≥ pS or pS ≥ p ≥ pB. We split the proof into the
corresponding two cases.
We first look at the case where pB ≥ p ≥ pS . Define the values ǫB > 0 and ǫS > 0 such that
qB = qB + ǫB and qS = qS + ǫS .
Now the claim follows from the following inequalities.
nqBE[v1 | v1 ≥ p]−mq
SE[w1 | w1 ≤ p]
= n(qB + ǫB)
(
Pr[pB ≥ v1 ≥ p]
Pr[v1 ≥ p]
E[v1 | p
B ≥ v1 ≥ p] +
Pr[v1 ≥ p
B]
Pr[v1 ≥ p]
E[v1 | v1 ≥ p
B ]
)
−m(qS + ǫS)
(
Pr[pS ≤ w1 ≤ p]
Pr[w1 ≤ p]
E[w1 | p
S ≤ w1 ≤ p] +
Pr[w1 ≤ p
S ]
Pr[w1 ≤ p]
E[w1 | w1 ≤ p
S ]
)
= nqBE[v1 | v1 ≥ p
B]−mqSE[w1 | w1 ≤ p
S ]
+nǫBE[v1 | p
B ≥ v1 ≥ p]−mǫ
SE[w1 | p
S ≤ w1 ≤ p]
≥ nqBE[v1 | v1 ≥ p
B]−mqSE[w1 | w1 ≤ p
S ],
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where the second inequality follows from ǫB = Pr[pB ≥ v1 ≥ p] and ǫ
S = Pr[pS ≤ w1 ≤ p], and the
last inequality follows from nǫB = mǫS and E[v1 | p
B ≥ v1 ≥ p] ≥ E[w1 | p
S ≤ w1 ≤ p].
For the second case, we proceed along the same lines. It now holds that pS ≥ p ≥ pB , hence we
define ǫB > 0 and ǫS > 0 such that qB = qB + ǫB and qS = qS + ǫS and nqB = mqS . The claim
then follows from a similar derivation.
nqBE[v1 | v1 ≥ p
B]−mqSE[w1 | w1 ≤ p
S ]
= n(qB + ǫB)
(
Pr[v1 ≥ p]
Pr[v1 ≥ pB]
E[v1 | v1 ≥ p] +
Pr[pB ≤ v1 ≤ p]
Pr[v1 ≥ pB ]
E[v1 | p
B ≤ v1 ≤ p]
)
−m(qS + ǫS)
(
Pr[w1 ≤ p]
Pr[w1 ≤ pS ]
E[w1 | w1 ≤ p] +
Pr[pS ≥ w1 ≥ p]
Pr[w1 ≤ pS ]
E[w1 | p
S ≥ w1 ≥ p]
)
= nqBE[v1 | v1 ≥ p]−mqE[w1 | w1 ≤ p]
+nǫBE[v1 | p
B ≤ v1 ≤ p]−mǫ
SE[w1 | p
S ≥ w1 ≥ p]
≤ nqBE[v1 | v1 ≥ p]−mq
SE[w1 | w1 ≤ p],
where the last inequality follows from nǫB = mǫS and E[v1 | p
B ≤ v1 ≤ p] ≤ E[w1 | p
S ≥ w1 ≥ p].
25
